The Neglected Rules: On Leadership and Dissent


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Only to be quoted if you intend to be flattering
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“Trust, like the soul, once gone is gone forever”
Catullus

Introduction
This chapter considers the concept ‘leadership’ in relation to an apparent antithesis: dissent. Two main arguments are advanced as part of this examination. First, that dominant ‘structurist’ models of leadership are deficient as models of leadership because they ignore fundamental aspects of context and process, specifically the part that so-called ‘followers’ have to play. Second, it is argued that there are fundamental rules applying to situations of leadership, based in trust, which are formulated not by ‘leaders’, but by ‘followers’.

In elaborating these arguments, the ‘structurist’ models of leadership are contrasted with models from a relational perspective. It is argued that the bulk of the traditional literature is actually about ‘leaders’ (people in charge) rather than ‘leadership’ (processes by which people are persuaded to co-operate), set within an entititative model of organisation - that is, a model emphasising an alleged unity of purpose, goals and values within an organisation. Such an approach ignores important considerations of process - specifically cognitive, social and political process - within a complex social context, portraying an unwarranted and unhelpful image of ‘followers’ as fully dependent on ‘leaders’. Issues such as trust cannot properly be comprehended within such a formulation. By contrast the relational approach highlights process issues. Leadership from this point of view is understood as a negotiated social order in which influence is achieved through trust, reduction of uncertainty, and the achievement of frameworks for action which are largely acceptable to followers. This perspective emphasises interdependencies between ‘leaders’ and ‘followers’, and sometimes even highlights situations where ‘leaders’ may be wholly dependent on ‘followers’.

Furthermore, while traditional models of leadership imply, or frankly describe, followers as if they were passively reactive to circumstances, in particular the behaviour of ‘leaders’, ‘followership’ in this perspective is an active consequence of choice.

To illustrate these claims, examples are taken from accounts of dissent in a military setting during wartime, which, as exemplars in an extreme context can help make apparent the critical role played by so-called followers in setting the parameters of acceptability and, more important, unacceptability, in the relations between leaders and followers, and therefore shed light on more mundane relations of everyday life.

Finally, a note of caution. There are three key terms used throughout this chapter:
leader; leadership; and follower. Each presents its own difficulties. Those surrounding ‘leader’ and ‘leadership’ are considered separately below, but something must be said early about the problems associated with ‘follower’. Use of this word in the leadership literatures generally has unfortunate and negative connotations in that it implies, as noted earlier, an unwarranted assumption of docility or passivity, particularly when taken in relation to the implied heroism of leaders. Nevertheless, alternative constructions are seldom satisfactory; one is either forced into using neologisms or unwieldy and wordy constructions such as “those who are subject to influence attempts”. Throughout the discussion, therefore, non-leaders will be referred to by the standard term ‘follower’, but this is for want of a better term. To highlight the problematic nature of the word, however, throughout it is placed within inverted commas (what philosophers often refer to as ‘scream quotes’) in order to draw attention to its deficiency as a general term.

**On dissent**

Conceptualising dissent is both straightforward and difficult. It is straightforward in the sense that everyone understands the underlying absence or distance from wholehearted commitment that dissent implies; the sense of contradicting or disagreeing with someone. Most people would also readily accept that dissent, like inclinations toward co-operation, in this straightforward sense also involves both cognitive and behavioural aspects, that, for example, one might disagree with someone, but choose not to express it. The concept becomes complex when considering such disagreements within a context of power relations, especially institutional power, between people.

For the purposes of this chapter, dissent is *any* example where people in a subordinate position withhold active co-operation, or exhibit a marked reluctance to obey orders. This may conjure up all sorts of lurid images of bloodletting, but violent rebellion is not really the subject matter here.

Below, there *are* some examples of outright rebellion, such as organised strike action (Dallas & Gill, 1985; James, 1987; Rothstein, 1985), or mutiny (Guttridge, 1992), but for the most part these are not discussed here because they introduce factors that tend to complicate the main arguments. Thus well known mutinies such as that at Etaples during the First World War (Dallas & Gill, 1985), the Nore and Spithead Mutinies (Guttridge, 1992; Mainwaring & Dobrée, 1935), the mutiny at Invergordon (Ereira, 1981; Guttridge, 1992) and, of course, the Mutiny of the Bounty (Barrow, 1989), have elements of organisation about them which may suggest that they are simply the work of congenital malcontents.

More relevant are the ‘small’ and spontaneous acts of rebellion, particularly those carried out by people who do not really want to confront or subvert the established order. These acts highlight, more than any large scale bloody uprising, the rules
underlying ‘leadership’, and underline the *active* nature of ‘followership’. The problem, however, is that these tend not to receive much attention in their own right, and are generally only mentioned in passing. They must be teased out line by line from accounts of larger activities. Nevertheless, these are the real focus of the chapter, and wherever possible, the arguments below will be illustrated with accounts of these small ‘rebellions’

**Dissent in a wartime military context**

There are two reasons for using military examples, one trivial, the other fundamental to the arguments in the chapter.

The first, and least important reason for concentrating on the military is that, whether some people like it or not, the military is an important strand of public service, albeit one that is often neglected in favour of more obvious candidates such as the health service or local government. As such it falls squarely within the remit of this book, and is a useful reminder of the scope of public service.

Second, and far more important, dissent, *any* dissent, in a military context is *dangerous*, especially during wartime, and therefore has much to teach us about everyday life. It has not been chosen as a subject gratuitously, nor has it been selected simply to be controversial. Indeed, although the term ‘mutiny’, which is applied to military dissent, is controversial - often avoided altogether by military authorities - implying mayhem and murder, most historical mutinies were rather mundane affairs:

> They were protests by servicemen who felt that their sufferings had become so unbearable that only the last resort of collective action could achieve relief. Such mutineers believed that they were justified by natural justice and that this, coupled with the seriousness of their complaints, outweighed all the forms of naval and military law which they were breaking. (James, 1987: 13).

The importance of such protests lies not in the form they took, which in any case often mirrored forms of protest in civilian life, but in the context in which they took place. During peacetime it is easy to dismiss cases of dissent - strikes and the like - simply as the work of ‘troublemakers’, ‘agitators’, ‘extremists’, and so on. In some cases they may well be, but as the single explanation for all cases of resistance it has an obvious and self-serving ideological basis, which often masks important issues and lessons. In blaming ‘professional malcontents’ for resistance, such ‘explanations’ do two things. First they contrast a largely mythological ‘docile’ workforce with malign and ill-intentioned extremists bent on the destruction of ‘civilisation as we know it’. Second, and far more important for the arguments here, they divert attention away from the relationship between those in charge and their subordinates, and tend to foster a view that implies, if it does not actually state, that those who are appointed to positions of
dominance are somehow free of culpability - an implied moral ascendancy. In other words, blame for the breakdown of ‘normal functioning’ is to be found ‘elsewhere’. Such a view clearly disavows the possibility that protest may be motivated by injustice, still less by principled disapproval.

Similar ‘explanations’ are sometimes advanced for the breakdown of order in military organisations, but they are harder to sustain. James (1987) comments that:

> the official mind in its obsession with hidden hands behind mutinies always assumed that the ordinary soldiers and sailors were somehow incapable of making up their own minds or thinking for themselves about matters which affected their daily lives. (James, 1987: 22)

This is amply borne out by the historical record. For example, when, towards the end of the First World War, there was widespread unrest among troops in the British and Dominion Forces (Dallas & Gill, 1985; Gilbert, 1994; James, 1987; Rothstein, 1985), Sir Douglas Haig, Commander-in-Chief of the British Expeditionary Force, was in no doubt about what, and who, to accuse. He put the blame firmly on the shoulders of ‘troublemakers’ in the ranks; men from the urban working class, who ‘come from a class which like to air real or fancied grievances’, and, with their ‘habits’ of trade unionism, voiced unrest and discontent (Dallas & Gill, 1985: 73 - 74). But, comforting though this ‘explanation’ may have been for Haig it does not bear even casual scrutiny - unless one subscribes to the view that ‘other ranks’ are somehow irretrievably stupid.

The punishments for ‘insubordination’ in the armed forces, let alone open rebellion during wartime, are potentially of the harshest severity (James, 1987). During the First World War, for instance, British soldiers could be condemned to death ‘by a handful of captains and lieutenants, gathered perfunctorily in a tent’ even for simple acts of insubordination - on at least one occasion a soldier was shot for refusing to put on his cap (Dallas & Gill, 1985: 38, 146 note 24). All military forces have at their disposal similar sanctions to help them ‘keep order’, and even when they fall short of the death penalty they are greatly to be feared. The notorious ‘Field Punishment no. 1’ is a particularly unpleasant example, which, under a variety of names, has been used by military authorities the world over and throughout history. It entailed tying a man to a cart wheel or gun carriage and leaving him there without food or water, sometimes for days.

The scale of the problem confronting members of the military wanting to protest should not be underestimated. Insubordination and mutiny are terms with very wide parameters in the face of which service personnel are practically defenceless in support of their rights (Dallas & Gill, 1985). James (1987) spells out the extent of this defencelessness under British military law: in the 1879 Army Discipline and Regulation Act, which is still in force, ‘a combination of two or more persons to resist
or to induce others to resist lawful military authority’ defined ‘mutiny’, a definition which also applies to naval and air force personnel. Similar laws exist in all military forces, regular and irregular.

Making a complaint anonymously was illegal, as was ‘any other method of obtaining redress for grievance real or imaginary’. James cites two cases illustrating the point. In the first a private serving with a Lancashire regiment wrote an anonymous letter to a newspaper criticising his officers, and was sentenced to six months by a court martial in South Africa in 1901. In the second example, a rating serving aboard HMS Repulse wrote to his MP complaining about arrangements for his leave. ‘He was traced and given 28 days detention’. Furthermore, private conversations among servicemen commenting on their superiors’ conduct were forbidden, and ‘disloyal or insulting words about the royal family, a serviceman’s ship or regiment or officers were punishable’:

A private of the Seaforths who spoke abusively about his regiment was given twelve months in 1901, but the coarse nature of an Irish soldier’s remarks about Queen Victoria in 1900 were thought to be too much for Her Majesty so his sentence was not passed to her for confirmation. (James, 1987: 11).

Similar restrictions, and punishments, also applied in the United States forces - for example one officer was sentenced to two years in 1945 for remarking that Roosevelt was a ‘son-of-a-bitch’ (James, 1987: 11).

It is clear from these examples that even simple peaceful protest was liable for punishment as mutiny - ‘a grave and dishonourable crime’. Unfortunately, servicemen did not always understand this, and often left themselves exposed for what they thought were reasonable actions. A sailor involved in the naval mutiny at Invergordon in 1931, for example, commented: ‘We were not disloyal or mutinying but fighting for our rights’ (James, 1987: 9. Also Ereira, 1981).

This chapter is not intended as a criticism of military authorities, in general terms or particular. The important point is that the scope for dissent within a military context is severely constrained, and even those forms of protest that are taken for granted within civilian life are liable for very severe punishment.

Under such circumstances it is not credible that those serving under military law would casually confront the constituted authorities, or allow ‘troublemakers’ to expose them to such sanctions on a trivial pretext. Indeed, explanations that rely on blaming troublemakers are, most often, simply an admission that those in charge are fundamentally incompetent. This is the key to this chapter. Dissent, or even open reluctance, within a military context, especially during wartime, cannot simply be
dismissed as trivial or wanton given the possible severity of punishment. It follows that when military authority is challenged in such circumstances, the issues must be particularly important for those who are taking action. Examination of such situations in which relations of 'leadership' have evidently broken down, together with the reasons given by the actors involved, can shed important light on processes of leadership and, especially, followership, with implications for our understanding of such relations in everyday life.

**Defining leadership**

Leadership as an idea has always been a problem. On the one hand the word is a perfectly ordinary one, and most people can discuss the subject without any difficulty (Kelvin, 1970). On the other hand, it is a term which, even in ordinary discourse, can evoke conflicting interpretations, and even strong emotions (e.g. Freeman, 1970; Levine, 1974). Attempts to define the concept underlying the word soon founder on a welter of contradictions, exclusions, special cases, and distinctions of mind numbing subtlety.

Cartwright & Zander (1953; 1968) observed that there was “little consensus about what leadership is or what it should be”, and Stogdill, in his monumental and definitive *Handbook of Leadership*, commented that there:

> are almost as many definitions of leadership as there are persons who have attempted to define the concept ... (Stogdill, 1974: 7).

He also lamented that despite many years of research:

> It is difficult to know what, if anything, has been convincingly demonstrated by replicated research. The endless accumulation of data has not produced an integrated understanding of leadership. (Stogdill, 1974: vii)

Nearly ten years later Bass (1981), in his update of Stogdill’s handbook, felt compelled to repeat the comments, and Quinn (1984) added:

> [The] ... seemingly endless array of unconnected empirical investigations is bewildering as well as frustrating. (Quinn, 1984: 10).

Stogdill gives what he calls a “rough scheme of classification” showing the variety of definitions and approaches devised by researchers and theoreticians (Bass, 1981: 7 - 16). This includes definitions given in terms of *group processes* (e.g. Cooley, 1902; Bernard, 1927); *influence* (e.g. Nash, 1929; Tead, 1935; Stogdill, 1950); *persuasion* (e.g. Schenk, 1928; Copeland, 1942) and *power* (e.g. French, 1956; French & Raven, 1959; Gerth & Mills, 1953). He also gives definitions of leadership in terms of
personality (e.g. Bingham, 1927; Kilbourne, 1935); the induction of compliance (e.g. Munson, 1921; Bennis, 1959); and leader behaviour (e.g. Carter, 1953; Hemphill, 1949; Fiedler, 1967).

Nevertheless, notwithstanding difficulties of definition, there is a general convergence of emphasis. Overall these definitions are of two general types: those which emphasise leaders, and those which concentrate on leadership.

**Structurist theories**
The dominant approach to leadership emphasises ‘leaders’. ‘Leaders’ in this tradition are identified *a priori* on the basis of establish order and appointed position within a hierarchical structure, hence the designation, in this chapter, *structurist*. Leadership is more or less synonymous with what leaders do, and is considered a personal quality rather than social relation. These approaches assume, or rely on, dependency of ‘followers’ on leaders, and conflate leadership with control. They are essentially static models, because the relationships between actors are defined by formal structures, which remain fixed whatever the quality of dynamic social, psychological, moral and political processes that exist between them (Kelvin, 1970). Even when relations break down, and followers are in dissent, the ‘leader’ is still leader in virtue of position.

Fiedler’s comments about his own Contingency Theory of Leadership Effectiveness are interesting in this context:

“By leadership behaviour we generally mean the particular acts in which a leader engages in the course of directing and coordinating the work of his group members. This may involve such acts as structuring the work relations, praising or criticising group members, and showing consideration for their welfare and feelings.” (Bass, 1981: 10. See also, Fiedler, 1964, 1967, 1978).

This is essentially a paternalistic position scarcely distinguishable from Fayol’s Classical Management (Fayol, 1949). Indeed it is significant that this strand of ‘leadership’ theory tends to use the terms ‘leader’ and ‘manager’ almost interchangeably (see Bass, 1981; Graumann & Moscovici, 1986; Hunt, 1991; Hunt, et al., 1984; Syrett & Hogg, 1992; Yetton, 1984 for examples).

But it contrasts sharply with real life examples. Hastings (1984) describes attitudes among the Allied Air Chiefs in the run up to the D-Day landings in 1944. Air Marshall Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory had been appointed Air Commander-in-Chief for Operation Overlord (the codename for the invasion of northern France), but was widely considered to have achieved the position illegitimately by intriguing to supplant Air Marshals Dowding and Park in the wake of the Battle of Britain. For this he aroused considerable personal animosity, and, despite his position, bomber
commanders ‘flatly declined to accept their orders from him and would acknowledge only the mandate of [Air Marshall Sir Arthur] Tedder’ the Deputy Supreme Commander of Overlord.

The fighter commanders also made clear their dislike of and lack of respect for the Commander-in-Chief. The American [Major General Lewis Hyde] Brereton, an officer of limited abilities commanding IXth Air Force, and the New Zealander [Air Marshall Sir Arthur] ‘Mary’ Coningham, commanding the British 2nd Tactical Air Force, united in their antagonism to Leigh-Mallory, while General Elwood R. “Pete” Quesada, commanding the close-support squadrons under Brereton, was a bewildered spectator of the wrangles: ‘I just didn’t know people at that level behaved like that. Nobody wanted to be under Leigh-Mallory, even the British.’ (Hastings, 1984: 52 - 53).

Despite this description, a structurist model of leadership would still have to consider Leigh-Mallory a ‘leader’ because, as noted before, these particular approaches take as their starting point situations of de jure authority, and concentrate more or less exclusively on the workings of that authority. The ‘leader’ is simply the person in charge, with authority over a group of others, usually appointed by some authority outside that group (see Fiedler, 1964: 171, for an explicit definition to this effect). But as the example above makes clear, this leaves a conceptual gap in what might reasonably be expected from a concept like leadership as opposed to, say, management. It is clear that some people are good at being in charge, and others not. It is not by chance that theorists and researchers in the structurist tradition are forced to distinguish between ‘effective’ and ‘ineffective’ leadership, because their focus is not really on leadership at all, but on leaders - that is on representatives of the political status quo. But, leaders by their definition may well owe their position to factors irrelevant (or even damaging) to leadership relations, such as luck, nepotism, intrigue, incompetence or purchase. The case of Leigh-Mallory puts this into high relief, as do the many, well-known, historical examples of incompetent officers in positions of command simply in virtue of ‘birth’, connections, or purchase (see Dixon, 1979; Foote, 1992; Guttridge, 1992; James, 1987; Macksey, 1988; Regan, 1991, for extensive examples).

The real problem here is the embedded assumption within structurist models that legitimacy, and therefore the goodwill of subordinates, follow necessarily from the fact of appointment to position. But again, the example makes it clear that legitimacy is based on the judgement of subordinates - it is not something that can be imposed.

There remains the problem of leadership itself, and how it relates to leaders. This presents real problems for structurist models, which, necessarily, define leadership simply as the ‘position’ of a leader, what ‘leaders’ do, or, bizarrely, something
‘leaders’ have, much like a virus or personality defect. But as Gibb (1969b: 210) pointed out, while this might seem like an obvious and convenient starting place for studying leadership ‘it embraces such a wide variety of relationships’ that, for research purposes, it is largely useless. Part of the problem is to identify what is or is not relevant to leadership. For example, if a particularly good leader is in the habit of wearing a pink woolly cardigan, are there any good a priori reasons for supposing that this is not essential to their success? - after all, Field Marshall Montgomery’s sartorial eccentricities, for example, especially his habit of wearing two cap badges in his beret (quite contrary to regulations incidentally) have often been cited as a partial reason for his success with his troops. Moreover, these approaches tend to have a universalistic objective in common - they are largely attempts to crystallise the essence of leadership abstracted from all particular circumstances - to identify what is sometimes called the one best way. Necessarily, therefore, they gloss over the importance of context, especially the role of ‘followers’. But context cannot be excluded in this way.

To take an illustrative example. Leadership personality theorists concentrated early on the task of identifying significant personality traits which distinguished leaders from ‘followers’. These were later called leadership traits to avoid the problem that many of them could not reasonably be considered aspects of ‘personality’, but seemed to have broader behavioural aspects. Among defining traits - those which leaders allegedly had to a more marked degree than ‘followers’ - studies identified, inter alia: intelligence, judgement, knowledge, fluency, adaptability, aggressiveness, assertiveness, enthusiasm, independence, self confidence, achievement drive, initiative and enterprise (Bass, 1981: 76).

These are undeniably admirable characteristics, and one can easily see how people with such qualities might well become influential. But, as Stogdill notes, a person so endowed might or might not rise to prominence, because an individual’s upward mobility often seems “to depend to a considerable degree upon being at the right place at the right time” (Bass, 1981: 82). Keegan (1987) makes a similar point: ‘...leadership ... is, like priesthood, statesmanship, even genius, a matter of externals almost as much of internalities’ (p11). In other words, personal characteristics cannot be taken apart from context, and, as Stogdill further notes, conceptions of desirable traits are culturally coded (Bass, 1981) - what is admirable and praiseworthy in one culture, may be irrelevant or even repulsive in another (Hofstede, 1994; Tropenaars, 1993).

The traits identified above are not really objective categories of individual characteristics. They are, on the contrary, moral, social, or political judgements of approval. That is to say, judgements, made by people of others whom they admire and approve of. There are other, equivalent but negative, words available in the lexical armoury for the same qualities when they are disapproved of. For example, a person regarded as knowledgeable and intelligent in a context of approval, could be labelled a
‘know-it-all bore’, or ‘too clever by half’, in a context of disapproval. An adaptable individual could be seen as inconsistent, spineless and uncommitted. Judgement may be called judgementalism; fluency called garrulousness; enthusiasm called hotheadedness; and self confidence called hubris, bumptiousness, pomposity, vanity or pride. And so on. Napoleon, for example, was widely admired for the confidence with which he conducted his battles - while they were victories. But the same characteristic was called over-confidence when he lost, especially after his final defeat at Waterloo in 1815 (Cronin, 1990).

How a particular characteristic is labelled depends critically on the context in which the judgement is made. Furthermore, any specific characteristic of a particular individual could be simultaneously labelled both positively and negatively, depending on the different moral, social or political standpoints of the observers. Thus a trade union leader who is seen as firm and committed by his or her members, might be seen as stubborn and backward looking by opponents in management. This is a perfectly well understood phenomenon, and history is replete with examples. Napoleon Bonaparte was simultaneously revered by his supporters and reviled by his enemies for the same characteristics (see, for example, Cronin, 1990). The same is true for Adolf Hitler (e.g. Keegan, 1987), Abraham Lincoln (e.g. Foote, 1992), Oliver Cromwell (e.g. Fraser, 1973), and indeed anyone else who achieves similar prominence. That the labels for ‘leadership’ traits are used in a quasi-scientific setting does not alter the fact that they are moral judgements - in this case judgements of approval. They cannot therefore be made, and nor can they have any force, when abstracted from the context in which leaders operate or are viewed - ‘followers’ being a crucial part of that context.

At issue are questions of dependency and interdependency. Definitions emphasising leaders imply a one-way dependency of ‘followers’ on leaders, and, by extension, therefore characterise ‘followers’, insofar as they are considered at all, merely as unthinkingly reactive to circumstances created by leaders. There is a hidden prescription here, one that structurism holds in common with all entitative models of organisation; that there is only one paramount model of reality - the one adopted by the ‘leader’. Descriptively, of course, this is nonsense, as the following example from the American Civil War shows:

The story went round how General Wigfall, commanding Texas troops, came across a guard reclining on a pile of boxes, his musket leaning against a nearby tree. ‘What are you doing here, my man?’ asked the General. ‘Nothin much, jes kinder takin care of this hyar stuff,’ replied the private without moving from his reclining position. ‘Do you know who I am, sir?’ ‘Wal, now’ pears like I know your face, but I can’t jes call your name - who is you?’ ‘I’m General Wigfall.’ Without rising, the soldier stuck out his hand. ‘General, I’m pleased to meet you. My
Whatever world General Wigfall looked out on, it was clearly not the same one that Private Jones inhabited. Within a structurist tradition there could only be one conclusion - that Private Jones was mistaken. Phenomenologically, of course, this is nonsense, but people like General Wigfall have at their disposal the means to impose their world view on those of others with less institutional power. Structurist models of leadership imply, as much by omission as anything else, that this is as it should be - the ‘leader’s’ perspective being the only one of real interest to them.

The implied model of person is a familiar one, a simple input-output model, or, in psychological terminology, a stimulus-response model (see figure 1). The principle of this model is that inputs, in the form of leader behaviours or initiatives, enter the system and responses, usually measured as productivity of some kind, appear at the other end as outputs. ‘Effective leadership’ is measured, indeed defined, by a high output from ‘followers’ (see Fiedler, 1964, 1978 for a good example). The box in the middle (the ‘followers’) which economists and engineers would refer to as throughputs, is seldom if ever examined. It is as if the leader’s inputs are magically transmuted into productivity via mysterious, but essentially uninteresting mechanical processes inside the black box, which, like a lathe, or a computer, is not itself aware of what is going on and therefore plays no major role in the process. Leadership therefore becomes little more than an exercise in resource management, capable of being performed by any clerk who knows the rules. The human ‘resources’ (subordinates) become like any other resources at the disposal of management - passive lumps - in

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**Figure 1:** Structurist models of leadership are based on a simple input - output model, in which person is conceptualised in simple mechanistic terms.

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this case of human flesh: hired hands, heads or legs, but certainly not brains (Braverman, 1974). Apart from all other considerations this flies in the face not only of common sense, but also of every development in the understanding of what it is to be human, whether psychological, sociological or anthropological. Note, however, that this view is, within these models, applied solely to ‘followers’; leaders in contrast are clearly thought to be endowed with that intelligence which is the defining characteristic of what it is to be human (Schein, 1970).

To summarise so far. It has been argued that concentrating solely on what ‘leaders’ do, or on what personal characteristics they might have, is simply not good enough as a basis for understanding what leadership is, or how it impinges on human existence - even at work. The picture is both incomplete and distorted. Because ‘followers’ do not figure in these models, they present at best a partial perspective on a complex social situation which, in the final analysis, cannot credibly be conceptualised in terms of ‘follower’ passivity. They distort the situation because they imply, by omission, that ‘followers’ have nothing of value to contribute. This undoubtedly leads to, or is based on, various forms of self-serving ideological constructions about the context of work, specifically the implied moral ascendancy of those in positions of power - captured, in short, by vacuous slogans such as ‘management’s right to manage’. But, more importantly, such models necessarily imply that all responsibility for the functioning of a working context must reside with ‘leaders’ alone, which is a bizarre notion to say the least. As Bakunin remarks:

*I am conscious of my inability to grasp any large portion of human knowledge in all its detail and developments. The greatest intelligence would not be equal to a comprehension of the whole, whence the necessity of the division and association of labour.* (Bakunin, in Dolgoff, 1971: 229 - 230. Also Bakunin, 1916: 32 - 33; Woodcock, 1977: 312 - 313).

Structurist models scarcely have room, and give less credibility, to the idea that a ‘leader’, by their definition, may not even be liked by his or her ‘followers, yet alone room to consider more troublesome concepts like co-operation and trust. Even when Fiedler, for example, talks about leader-member relations as good or bad, it is merely as a feature of the leader’s situation which he or she must take into account, not as something involving any active responses of followers. These are essentially static models of leadership, because relations between the various actors, ‘leaders’ and ‘followers’ alike, are predefined by a formalised structure which remains more or less invariant whatever the quality of dynamic, social, psychological, political and cultural processes that exist between them.

**Relational theories**
In contrast to structurist models, those emphasising process and context take as their
starting point considerations of leadership (not leaders), based on a quite different model of person to that embedded within structurist models - the intelligent actor. Some representative examples of this approach were mentioned earlier, under the headings group processes, power, influence, and persuasion (Stogdill, 1974; Bass, 1981). Two things stand out as particularly interesting about these groups of definitions. First their vintage; many date from the earliest years of this century, and are at least as old as the structurist theories considered above. Despite this they are consistently overlooked in the literatures, particularly those of management. Second, these definitions have an overall sophistication lacking in the structurist models, locating leadership within broadly social processes, and explicitly recognising that leadership, however defined, does not occur in a vacuum. Stogdill notes, for example, that:

The influence concept recognizes the fact that individuals differ in the extent to which their behaviours affect activities of a group. It implies a reciprocal relationship between leaders and followers, but not one necessarily characterized by domination, control, or induction of compliance on the part of the leader. It merely states that leadership exercises a determining effect on the behaviours and on activities of the group. (Bass, 1981: 10).

The important point here is the explicit recognition of power and influence, and by extension also politics, as a significant aspect of leadership phenomena, as it is for other human relations (Foucault, e.g., 1979; Lee & Lawrence, 1991; Lukes, 1974, 1986; Thompson & McHugh, 1990).

Persuasion is a powerful instrument for shaping expectation and belief - particularly in political, social and religious affairs. ... Power is regarded as a form of influence relationship. ... many of those committed at one time to trust building, openness, and participatory approaches ... have come to acknowledge the importance of power relations in understanding leadership. (Bass, 1981: 11 - 12).

Such definitions tend to emphasise interdependency, and other relational factors, between leaders and ‘followers’, in contrast to the dependency relations emphasised in the structurist models considered earlier. For this reason they are referred to here as relational models. An illustrative comment is given by Merton (1969), who regarded leadership as: “An interpersonal relation in which others comply because they want to, not because they have to.” This has considerable echoes in the views expressed by Michael Bakunin in 1871:

In the matter of boots, I defer to the authority of the bootmaker; concerning houses, canals or railroads, I consult the architect or the
engineer. For such specialist knowledge I apply to such a ‘savant’. But I allow neither the bootmaker nor the architect nor the savant to impose his authority on me ... I recognise no infallible authority, even in special questions; ... I bow before the authority of specialists because it is imposed upon me by my own reason. ... I receive and I give; such is human life. Each directs and is directed in ... turn. Therefore there is no fixed and constant authority, but a continual fluctuation of mutual, temporary, and above all voluntary authority and subordination. (In Dolgoff, 1971: 229 - 230. Also Bakunin, 1916: 32 - 33; Woodcock, 1977: 312 - 313).

This is essentially an expression of contingent, or bounded, trust, based on reflection and sentiment. Such formulations draw a sharp distinction between cooperation and coerced compliance, although in practice the lines between persuasion, or influence, and coercion, on the one hand, and therefore co-operation and mere compliance on the other, are not so easy to draw (Cartwright, 1959; French & Raven, 1959; Lukes, 1986; Prince, 1988; Wrong, 1979) This is why it is so important to have a firm understanding of power and its dynamics in relation to leadership phenomena (Thompson & McHugh, 1990). Nevertheless, theorists from this perspective take a clear stance on the important differences between leadership and coercion, arguing they are not at all the same phenomena. On the whole leadership in this tradition tends to be viewed as the outcome of interaction, rather than the prime determinant of it. Copeland (1942), for example, states:

leadership is the art of ... influencing a body of people by persuasion or example to follow a line of action. It must never be confused with drivership ... which is the art of compelling a body of people by intimidation or force to follow a line of action. (Bass, 1981: 11)

Structurist theories on the whole do not make this distinction, or, when they do, fail to encompass the full implications. Stogdill, in reviewing definitions of leadership as the effect of interaction says:

This group of theorists was important in calling attention to the fact that emergent leadership grows out of the interaction process itself. It can be observed that leadership truly exists only when acknowledged and conferred by other members of the group. (Bass, 1981: 13)

In this quotation Stogdill is reiterating the same point as Bakunin, quoted earlier. Leadership by this view is not solely a function of appointment (de jure authority), but is crucially dependent on the reactions and responses of the ‘followers’, and the relations between leaders and ‘followers’ (de facto authority). By this view leadership is always emergent leadership (Prince, 1988), with an essential basis in trust (Bass,
This principle currently enjoys the status of a platitudinous. It is routinely quoted in chapters on leadership in general management textbooks (e.g. Buchanan & Huczynski, 1985; Child, 1984; Gordon, 1987; Handy, 1993; Wilson & Rosenfeld, 1990). But once the basic principle has been announced it is then just as routinely ignored, and the emphasis quickly shifts back to leaders. Although the relational tradition has always co-existed, in one form or another, alongside the structurist tradition, for inscrutable reasons it has generally been overlooked in terms of research and public exposure. The management texts, as the main conduit through which research in these areas is transferred to ‘users’ illustrate this point very well, concentrating almost exclusively on the structurist tradition (e.g. Hunt, 1991; Syrett & Hogg, 1992). And yet that tradition does not sit well with the principle that leadership exists only when accepted, conferred and conceded by ‘followers’, if only because structurism does not acknowledge any part for followers.

But the principle of follower participation has exquisitely important consequences, with far reaching implications. First it implies choice - not that ‘followers’ are always in a position to choose who is placed in charge of them, but, more critically, who and what they will willingly follow. This further implies choice about who and what not to follow. In other words, the principle so lightly tossed to one side by management texts has the important implication that in circumstances which one might define as leadership (as opposed to, say, headship (Gibb, 1958, 1969b) drivership (Copeland, 1942) or simply command (Watson, 1980)), ‘followers’ have the choice and ability to say no - the choice and ability of dissent. Furthermore, this is not something which can be conferred or denied by authority as a privilege, any more than constituted authority can legislate for what people will or will not like. As an aspect of individual and group sentiment it is entirely outside formal authority’s remit. That this principle is at odds with the so-called ‘new managerialism’ is beyond dispute - dissent having been practically ‘criminalized’ in formulations emphasising managerial prerogatives over and above those of other groups within a working environment (Lee & Lawrence, 1991; Pollitt 1990). But again, there are several historical examples which illustrate forcefully the importance of the principle of choice.

As is well known, after his defeat at Leipzig in 1813 Napoleon Bonaparte was forced to abdicate, and was subsequently exiled as ‘Emperor, and Sovereign of the Isle of Elba’ (Cronin, 1990: 374). In 1815, however, he escaped from Elba, with around a thousand followers and landed in the south of France at the start of what became known as the ‘hundred and thirty six days’, culminating in the Battle of Waterloo (1815). The Bourbon king, Louis XVIII, despatched the army to intercept Napoleon’s small force, and bring him to Paris under arrest. This presented an interesting situation for those involved because the army opposing Napoleon’s return was the same one he had led through many wars and campaigns, and whatever the final verdict of history
most of the soldiers revered him practically as a deity. Furthermore, the soldiers they confronted were former comrades.

Near Grenoble Napoleon’s force was opposed by a battalion of the 5\textsuperscript{th} Regiment of the Line. Napoleon walked alone towards these soldiers until he was within pistol range. A Captain Randon gave the order: ‘There he is. Fire!’, but there was silence:

\begin{quote}
After taking a few steps, Napoleon stopped and drew apart the lapels of his overcoat, exposing his white waistcoat. ‘If you want to kill your Emperor,’ he called in a loud voice, ‘here I am.’ ... Back came a tremendous shout of ‘Long live the Emperor!’ The men of the 5\textsuperscript{th}, waving their shakos on bayonet tips, rushed cheering towards him. ‘Just see if we want to kill you,’ shouted one soldier, rattling his ramrod up and down the barrel of his empty musket. In a matter of minutes the soldiers had whipped from their haversacks the old tricolour ribbons they had been obliged to remove eleven months before and stuck them in their hats, while on to the grass fell a litter of white cockades [symbol of the Bourbons]. (Cronin, 1990: 391 392).
\end{quote}

Meanwhile, Louis XVIII’s brother, the Comte d’Artois, had travelled to organise the defence of Lyons. He had at his disposal three line regiments, and around 1,500 National Guards, under the command of a very able commander, Marshall MacDonald. Under the Bourbons MacDonald, who had been promoted by Napoleon, had received considerable favours, and unlike the soldiers was not about to give up his privileges for his former Emperor. At a parade of the troops in the Place Bellecour, he gave a rousing speech and called upon them to show their loyalty by giving the cheer ‘Long live the King!’. There was silence.

\begin{quote}
Then Artois walked along the lines in pouring rain and spoke in a kindly way to a veteran dragoon. He invited the dragoon to give a lead by shouting ‘Long live the King!’ Again there was dead silence. Artois left the parade, jumped into his berlin and took the road to Paris. That evening the people of Lyon welcomed Napoleon into their city. (Cronin, 1990: 392 - 393).
\end{quote}

From a relational viewpoint, leadership is \textit{characterised} by choice and commitment, on the part of ‘followers’, to act or not in accordance with proposals for action, thought or ends put forward by would-be ‘leaders’. Clearly, by this principle, neither Captain Randon, Marshall MacDonald nor the Comte d’Artois were leaders because ‘their’ soldiers \textit{chose} not to follow them, despite their evident seniority.

By extension, leadership entails the engagement of opinions favourable, or at least \textit{indifferent}, but not hostile, to what is intended, how it is to be done, and to what ends.
This is a principle of ‘acceptable influence’, involving the engagement of values and sentiments about means and ends (Brown & Hosking, 1984; Hosking & Morley, 1992; Prince, 1988) - what MacGregor-Burns (1978) calls modal and end values. That is, values about what is to be done, and how. It further implies relations of mutual positive interdependence - which Deutsch (1968) called promotive interdependence - between all the actors in a situation, rather than one-way dependence of ‘followers’ on ‘leaders’ (Brown & Hosking, 1984; Gibb, 1958, 1969a,b; Hollander, 1964; Hollander & Webb, 1955; Hosking & Morley, 1992; MacGregor-Burns, 1978). In sum, this tradition emphasises choice rather than constraint (Prince, 1988), and trust rather than coercion. It is a tradition that recognises while it may be possible to coerce the body (of followers), leadership is really about engaging hearts and minds (Dixon, 1979).

This highlights the fundamental basis of relational approaches to leadership, which take it as axiomatic that people are most appropriately considered as intelligent actors (rather than passive human resources). That people, even institutionally unimportant people, are active in trying to understand their environment, make judgements about it, and attempt to influence it in some way (Burrell & Hearn, 1989; Hosking & Morley, 1992, Lee & Lawrence, 1991). This necessarily draws attention to questions about values and interests - those who seek to influence their environment generally do so on the basis of particular values and interests that they wish to protect or promote. In turn it highlights the importance of cognitive, social and, above all, political processes within organisations (Hosking & Morley, 1992). This model of the intelligent actor is quite at odds with the ‘passive lumps’ characterised in structurist theories as ‘followers’. Its importance is far reaching when taken seriously.

**Negotiated social orders**

The social contexts within which intelligent actors operate are, necessarily, social orders based on understandings of that context which may or may not be commonly shared (e.g. Berger & Luckmann, 1976; Hosking & Morley, 1992; Kelvin, 1970). Part of this understanding will be based on shared cultural codes and assumptions, but a further contribution to establishing shared understandings can be characterised properly as an aspect of ‘leadership’. By this view leadership, as opposed to ‘command’ (or its synonyms), becomes a process by which a social order becomes established and maintained, within, and responsive to, a context of choice understood in relation to values and sentiments about ends and means (Prince, 1988).

There is an issue of creativity here. Within structurist traditions, because it is assumed that people in subordinate positions simply respond to their environments, of which managers and ‘leaders’ are key components, there is implied a one-way change process, with the environment (managers) shaping subordinate members of staff to fit. What is left from this account is the other side of the equation. People not only respond to their environments, they shape them. This is obvious when one considers the physical environment (e.g. Simon, 1982), but it is also true of the social

environment, as some of the examples already given demonstrate. Organisations may shape people, but people also shape organisations, whether as individuals or in groups. Something of this point can be seen in the following passage from Hastings (1984), which also clearly highlights the important role of trust. He describes what happened in an action on 11th June 1945, involving the British troops around Cristot in France during the Overlord offensives following D-Day:

A sour sense, not of defeat, but of fumbled failure overlay the British operations on the Western flank. ... Lieutenant-Colonel Robin Hastings of the 6th Green Howards was mistrustful of the reported lack of opposition - he anyway lacked confidence in his elderly brigadier - ... Hastings remained bitter about the losses his men had sustained in an attack that he believed was misconceived - that was simply “not on” ... Before every attack, most battalion commanders made a private decision about whether its objectives were “on”, and thereby decided whether its purpose justified an all-out effort, regardless of casualties, or merely sufficient movement to conform and to satisfy the higher formation. Among most of the units which landed in Normandy, there was a great initial reservoir of willingness ... Thereafter, following bloody losses and failures, many battalion commanders determined privately that they would husband the lives of their men when they were ordered into attack, making personal judgements about an operation’s value. (Hastings, 1984: 164 - 165. Emphasis added).

A shared social order enables action. It is not, however, something that can be imposed (any more than an organisational culture can) but is essentially negotiated, whether tacitly or overtly, between ‘leaders’ (those whom followers choose to follow) and ‘followers’ (those who, for whatever reason, are not leaders). It should be noted here that negotiation implies the opportunity for achieving something by all participants, related to their values and interests. Those who believe they can not achieve something of value from the process will not negotiate, and will probably withdraw (Hosking & Morley, 1992; Morley & Stephenson, 1977).

Such social orders are not, however, static, but dynamic and changing, although the rate of change will depend on many factors internal and external to the context. This suggests that the process of negotiating a social order is never completely finalised, but will be ongoing within any particular set of relationships. It further implies that processes of leadership are never finalised, but are negotiated and renegotiated in successful relations as circumstances change. Complacency and leadership do not mix.

**Values and interests**

The principles of choice and the intelligent actor elaborated earlier draw attention to the importance of values and, by extension, interests. Management literatures are full
of discussions about values, but, as one might expect, these discussions tend to focus only on those values promoted, and protected, by management - that is, by those with institutional power (Hosking & Morley, 1992; Lee & Lawrence, 1991). Much more important, however, are the values, and concomitant interests, of subordinates within organisations, because it is these that determine co-operation and resistance.

It is something of a platitude to say that people’s values and interests are shaped by much more than the context within which they work, although when one considers all the recent talk about ‘organisational goals’ as if these were the sole focus of importance within organisations, one could be forgiven for believing that it is no longer true once someone walks through the office door. Of course, people vary in the extent to which they elaborate or hold to different sets of values and interests, but nevertheless, when they enter any context, whether work, or warfare, or whatever, they do so with some basis on which to understand and judge that context - and this basis is properly and necessarily considered as a value base, regardless of the extent to which the values are held or elaborated. Judgement, of course, implies approval or disapproval.

Values can be grouped, crudely, into three overlapping sets: personal; professional; and institutional (called by Morgan (1997), extramural; career; and task, respectively). Personal values include strong religious, political or social values, including those relating to protection of family and home. Professional values are pretty much self-explanatory, and include codes of conduct and ethics imposed by the professions. Institutional values are those relating to the job in hand, that fleeting moment of employment in a lifetime of much else. Unfortunately much of the management literature, including structurist models of leadership, focuses only on institutional values, to which they accord privileged status. Hence the hysteria about ‘whistle blowers’ who, having found the tension between personal morals and what they are asked to do at work intolerable then ‘blow the gaff’ (Clinard, 1990; Punch, 1996).

But it is clear that personal and professional values are equally, if not more, important to explain a person’s motivations. Certainly the different sets of values and interests can come into tension or conflict, and therefore may be possible grounds for dissent. In particular, a person who is asked or required to do something that fundamentally contradicts deeply held values is likely to feel considerable tension, or cognitive dissonance, which will have to be resolved one way or another (Festinger & Aronson, 1968), often by some form of dissent. There are some excellent historical examples of such situations.

Lieutenant William Douglas-Home, brother of the future British Prime Minister Sir Alec, and later a celebrated playwright, had made it clear to his fellow officers that if he disapproved of something done on the battlefield, he would say so. During the Allied offensives in northern France in 1944, he served as a troop commander of
‘Crocodiles’ - a particularly odious weapon, being a flame throwing tank. The Allies had planned a massed air bombardment of a town, in order to induce its garrison to surrender, and this so appalled Douglas-Home he immediately ‘set out on his own initiative to parley the Germans into giving up, declining to have anything to do with the attack himself’ (Hastings, 1984: 254). For this he was court-martialled and sent to serve a term of imprisonment in Wormwood Scrubs.

Another, more recent example, throws an interesting twist on the same situation - an officer who argued that he actually ‘followed’ orders, but was still dismissed from the service for doing so. Captain Lawrence Rockwood was an intelligence officer with the US Army specialising in Central America. By all accounts he was a man of very high principle. On one occasion, for example, he spoke in defence of a colleague who had been disciplined for expressing misgivings about US policy to a priest (Katz, 1995).

Rockwood was posted to Haiti in September 1994 as part of the American occupation force there following the coup by Raoul Cedras. That force was, according to a speech made by President Clinton, there to prevent brutal atrocities being carried out by supporters of the coup against those of the ousted president Aristide. Although Rockwood’s primary role, as a counter intelligence officer, was to collect intelligence about possible threats to US troops, he said that he immediately began receiving reports about brutality in the island’s prisons: ‘This information was coming in through intelligence channels. I didn’t go out looking for it’. Some of the information came from US soldiers - including one report of a man who had been chained to a wall for so long the skin on his back had rotted.

In addition, Rockwood also received a report from the Pentagon expressing concern about possible brutality in the Haitian prisons. He argued later that, as far as he understood the situation, he was required by international law to investigate these reports, and prevent any brutality he discovered. Accordingly he asked his superiors to investigate, but was told it was not a priority. Later he asked for permission to investigate himself, but was refused on the grounds that regulations demanded a Military Police escort, but the Military Police were refusing to supply one.

Mindful of the fate of Lieutenant General Yamashita, who had been found guilty of failure to prevent war crimes during World War II and was subsequently executed in 1946, and of the fates of the war crimes defendants at Nuremberg in 1945 - 46, Rockwood wrote a letter of complaint, alleging that his superiors were subverting the President’s ‘mission intent’ for Haiti: ‘The President is my commander-in-chief. I looked hard in Haiti but I couldn’t find anyone that outranked him’ (Katz, 1995: 5). Subsequently he broke into the prison at Port au Prince to look for himself at the conditions. His inspection was cut short when he was escorted from the building by a US military attaché.
It says something about the military authorities’ view of Rockwood’s protest that he was later sent for psychiatric examination. At his trial, he was portrayed as a headstrong and arrogant figure. It is significant that the authorities asked for a prison sentence of six years - five for arguing with a senior officer when he allegedly said: ‘I am an American military officer, not a Nazi military officer’. His final comment after his court martial is particularly illuminating: ‘You can’t leave the military in the hands of cynical people who believe that might is right’. (Katz, 1995: 5).

As Rockwood himself pointed out, the treatment he received for acting on his own ethical initiative contrasts very sharply with judgments at the Nuremberg war crimes trial in 1945. Field Marshall Wilhelm Keitel, for example, argued in his defence that he only obeyed orders, but this was rejected and he was executed in 1946 (Keegan, 1995: 87).

The Psychological Contract

An important aspect of working relationships that links discussion of values and interests more closely to that of trust, is the psychological contract (Handy, 1993). In formal terms this does not exist, but insofar as employers and employees are located within a common cultural nexus, then the psychological contract comprises what one might call the implied terms of the formal employment contract. These implied terms set limits on what is and is not acceptable.

When people enter any context they have expectations about concepts such as ‘fairness’, justice and equity. Admittedly these may be loosely formulated, if at all, but they provide the basis from which a person will make judgements, and decisions to commit, or otherwise, to a situation, another person, or an organisation. It is on the basis of such judgements as ‘fairness’ that trust is built or destroyed (Coulson, 1997). In relation to leadership, these are the judgements that define a relation as one of leadership or something else.

It must be emphasised that such judgements are not necessarily, or even very often, based on expectations of freedom from difficulty, hardship or effort. It all depends on the context and the nature of the contract. For example, during the American Civil War, the soldiers of General Thomas ‘Stonewall’ Jackson were notable for their willingness to accept great hardships despite being poorly fed, clothed, and equipped. During the Shenandoah Valley Campaign of 1862 in particular, Jackson’s soldiers marched nearly 500 miles in 30 days - an average of nearly 17 miles a day on foot - skirmishing daily. They fought five battles, defeated four numerically superior armies, completely routing two in the process, and captured large quantities of stores and prisoners (Foote, 1992; Selby & Roffe, 1971). The soldiers revered Jackson, and yet he was not noted for his leniency, or even for his overt friendliness. On the contrary, many of his soldiers (and colleagues) thought him rather odd, and he had something of a reputation for harshness in meting out punishments (Foote, 1992; Katcher, 1994).
The key to Jackson’s success was not his mildness, but his ability to deliver victories. For the soldiers under his command the Civil War was being fought on home ground, and more than anything most wanted the invading Northern armies defeated and chased out. To achieve this they willingly followed someone who could help them to win battles, meanwhile accepting the hardships apparently entailed by the process.

In a similar vein, there is an account given by Lieutenant Andrew Wilson of the Buffs during the runup to D-Day in 1944 (Hastings, 1984). After joining up he and the other young officers spent months in a relatively peaceful routine dominated by mess life. At the beginning of 1944, however, things changed abruptly, and their relatively peaceful existence was replaced by training and exercises which took them and the rest of the regiment to ‘the very limits of its endurance: “We suddenly knew we were going to be put through the full Monty treatment”’ (Hastings, 1984: 55). But far from resenting the change, Wilson and his colleagues welcomed it as preparation in earnest for what they had to do once they were in France.

The psychological contract, together with the values and interests that a person brings to a context, and those that develop within that context, form a web of evaluation. On this basis people make judgements, cognitive and affective, about their situation. These elements underlie judgements about acceptability and unacceptability alluded to earlier.

Acceptability

In a world is viewed through the managerial lens, questions of acceptability apply only to subordinates, with those holding de jure position judging those inferior to them in institutional status: acceptable performance; acceptable commitment; acceptable behaviour; acceptable goals. Within such a framework protest, withholding assent, or objecting to managerial prerogative, is generally treated as pathological, or at least something that must be overcome in order that the managerial prerogative is preserved (Lee & Lawrence, 1991; Thompson & McHugh, 1990). The demonisation of dissent in the managerialist perspective is manifestly part of the same tradition as the entitative models of organisation and structurist theories of leadership. The standpoint is solely that of those with institutional power - the status quo - with the perspective of subordinates, or ‘followers’ being almost entirely ignored. But, judgements of acceptability are also made by subordinates - of themselves, their colleagues, and, above all, of their ‘leaders’. Subordinates can and will make judgements about their contexts, including judgements about those in charge of them and of what they are expected to do for those people. As one of Hastings’ respondents put it, when talking about the situation in Normandy in 1944:

In the end we all became ‘canny’, and would obey orders only to the extent that there appeared a reasonable expectation of carrying them out. (Hastings, 1984: 228).
A person put in charge of others can, *when it is part of the psychological contract between them*, expect a certain level of co-operation. But there are important limits, and these are imposed not by those in charge, but by the ‘followers’ themselves, set in relation to the implied terms of the psychological contract, and developed within their frameworks of values and interests, some of them shared, some not. The situation can be conceptualised very simply, as in figure 2 below.

Figure 2 is based on comments made by Barnard (1938) and Sherif (1967). It shows a continuum running from ‘acceptable’ to ‘unacceptable’, with a broad zone in the centre labelled ‘indifferent’. Broadly speaking, the behaviour and demands of anyone in charge of others will be evaluated along this continuum *by their subordinates*.

**Figure 2:** The limits of co-operation are set within the terms of a psychological contract between those who influence and those who are influenced. The main parameters are those of acceptability and unacceptability which are set by those who choose to follow; they cannot be imposed. Nevertheless they are likely to be an important aspect of the overall culture in which the actors are themselves set, and to this extent they may be more or less shared by all parties involved in a situation of influence. The fuzziness of the lines in this diagram are meant to indicate that the parameters are not hard and fixed, but are more or less fluid. Furthermore the boundaries between the three zones shown in the diagram are also moveable, depending on context, issues at stake, local conditions, and so on.
Those things judged to be *acceptable* are clearly not going to give grounds for resistance. Followers’ values and interests are not threatened, and may even be served, and there is, therefore, a basis for full, perhaps even willing, co-operation, as in the cases of Stonewall Jackson’s soldiers and Lieutenant Andrew Wilson cited earlier, who clearly judged what was asked of them to be acceptable *in the circumstances*.

Judgements of indifference are slightly different. Here fundamental values and interests (of the ‘followers’) are not threatened, but neither are they served. But - and this must be emphasised - no-one has strong feelings about *everything* they are asked to do, and much of the time will be more or less indifferent to it, particularly if already implied by the psychological contract. This ‘zone of indifference’ represents a large reservoir of latent goodwill. But violations of that goodwill can, and will, make it shrink.

Judgements of unacceptability on the other hand give firms grounds for resistance and opposition, whether psychological or behavioural. When something is judged to be unacceptable by ‘followers’, this implies perceived threat to fundamental values and interests, an undermining of trust, and vigilance - monitoring the behaviour of those in power to identify further threats. Both ends and means may be considered unacceptable - what is done, and how it is to be achieved - as well as the person promoting them, which includes judgements of incompetence. The examples given above make it clear that people in subordinate positions can, and do, make such judgements. Whether they choose to act on them is, of course, a different matter. The following are examples to illustrate the point further.

In the early stages of the American Civil War soldiers of both sides were able to transfer between units, or even arms of service. Unpopular officers, particularly those with a reputation as martinets, frequently found that their units had transferred *en masse* elsewhere. The result of this was that appointed officers were often left with nothing to command, except on paper (Katcher & Youens, 1975).

As is well known, the British Army was sent to intervene in the early stages of the Russian Revolution. This was extremely unpopular, particularly with soldiers who thought they were to be demobilised at the conclusion of the First World War. Accordingly, in 1919, the 6th Battalion of the Royal Marine Light Infantry mutinied and refused to go into action against the Bolsheviks. All mention of them was later excised from official records of the so-called North Russian Campaign (James, 1987).

During August and September 1946, 258 soldiers from the 13th Battalion the Parachute Regiment were court martialled for mutiny. Earlier in the year, on 14th May, they had held a demonstration at the edge of their camp in Malaya, protesting about the poor conditions they were expected to live in. They were addressed first by a divisional
general, later by a colonel, and warned that their actions, or, more precisely, their 
*inactions*, were mutinous. They were ordered to fall in, but refused. Apparently the 
response was some indecisive shuffling and contemptuous whistles. By and large the 
demonstration was relatively good-natured. They saw nothing wrong in what they 
were doing, but considered they were only standing up for their rights (James, 1987: 
8). The army, of course, saw it differently, but the sentences meted out at the court 
martial were later quashed.

The situation becomes more complex when one considers that the three zones 
identified above will probably be set differently by different people, and will shift for 
a particular individual according to circumstances. For example, someone who has just 
received a large gas bill is probably going to be less tolerant than if they had received a 
large cheque through the post. Similarly, soldiers who are well trained and fresh are 
likely to be more tolerant than those who have just returned from arduous 
campaigning. Hastings gives a very good example of this. Discussing veterans 
returning from the fighting in the Mediterranean, who were expected to take part in the 
D-Day landings, he comments:

> Many of the men from the Mediterranean, above all the old regular 
soldiers, were bitter that, after fighting so hard for so long, they were 
now to be called upon once again to bear the brunt of the battle. A staff 
officer described the difficulties with one unit recalled from the 
Mediterranean for the invasion: “The 3rd Royal Tank Regiment were 
virtually mutinous just before D-Day. They painted the walls of the 
barracks in Aldershot with such slogans as ‘No Second Front’, and had 
it not been for their new commanding officer, ... I really think they might 
have mutinied in fact.” Lieutenant-Colonel Michael Carver of 7th 
Armoured’s 1st Royal Tank Regiment found some of his senior NCOs 
appearing before him to protest about their role, and echoing 
complaints from their wives, who demanded to know why those who had 
sat in England for four years and had not “done their bit” could not 
now take over the burden. It was a sentiment shared by the Prime 
Minister. (Hastings, 1984: 57)

Quite how psychological dissent becomes translated into behavioural or active dissent 
is difficult to say. Certainly it is not possible to identify *all* the necessary conditions 
and triggers, and much will be determined by features of the overall context. Indeed, 
in some examples of mutiny, it can be a relatively small spark or irritation that 
precipitates the whole thing (Dallas & Gill, 1985; James, 1987; Rothstein, 1985). 
Psychological dissent can be disguised, so that mere grudging compliance can appear 
to be co-operation, especially in circumstances of extreme threat. But, as several of the 
examples quoted earlier show, gaining behavioural compliance is not at all the same 
thing as ‘winning hearts and minds’, which is why the military examples are so

important.

The key point in all of this is that the parameters of acceptability are set not by those with institutional power, but by those who are subordinate. In matters of leadership it is followers who concede leadership, who *choose* whether to follow willingly. This is not, however, to suggest that institutional power and position are totally irrelevant. On the contrary, from the examples of dissent given above, it is quite clear that in some cases those protesting often thought of themselves as taking legitimate actions similar to their civilian counterparts (James, 1987), only to fall foul of different definitions of their actions - they being in the relatively weak position, and therefore having their own explanations and understandings dismissed as ‘inaccurate’. This is what has been described as the hegemony of power - the ability of those with institutional power to define, in the face of all opposition, situations to suit themselves or their rules (see e.g. Lukes, 1974; 1986; Wrong, 1979). But the point remains that *willing co-operation*, as opposed to mere behavioural compliance, is a matter of *follower choice*.

**Concluding comments**

Full understanding of leadership needs acknowledgement that it is contextual. Despite the dominance of structurist theories which concentrate on leaders, rather than leadership, it is clear that a focus simply on people ‘in charge’ is not a sufficient basis on which to understand the complex dynamic processes that underlie relations between ‘leaders’ and ‘followers’. Contexts, critically, are set and developed by sets of actors in interaction with one another, in a cycle of mutual creation and influence - interdependencies rather than dependencies. People adapt themselves to their surroundings, including other people, and their surroundings subtly alter themselves to adapt to them. The distinction is well captured by the slogan: the “organisation of production” (structurist models) versus the “production of organisation” (relational models) (Burrell & Hearn, 1989).

When people interact, they structure their interactions. These structuring processes have cognitive, social and political dimensions (Hosking & Morley, 1992), and, perhaps most important, evaluative dimensions. Intelligent actors in interaction judge situations and one another - especially those who are apparently in charge. The basis of these judgements is to be found in the various values and interests that participants bring to the situation, and which they use to structure their own lives. Some of these will be shared, particularly those derived from a common cultural heritage. Others will be diverse. Indeed diversity is probably considerable in any social situation. But such differences do not matter if the situation is one in which diverse values, interests, goals and judgements are in consonance - that is where interdependency is recognised and respected by actors in a situation, especially those with power.

The issue of recognised interdependency is important. What it demonstrates is that leadership, far from being a simple unidimensional feature of life, with a well
established set of rules easily applied, is actually a phenomenon of considerable complexity. To understand it fully requires consideration of other factors and processes such as power, influence, authority, legitimacy, trust and status, all of which are themselves difficult concepts. But what it also draws attention to is the importance of relational issues, and consideration of the broad context within which leadership takes place. This requires a diagnostic turn of mind, and a willingness to accept that social situations are fluid, often contradictory, and even paradoxical at times (Morgan, 1997).

Examples of dissent, or open mutiny and rebellion, underline the role of choice, specifically the irreducible element of follower choice in leadership - that leadership is conceded by those who follow, not taken by those who lead. They also highlight the critical role of values, interests, and relations of trust, the last being understood in relation to the various values and interests of actors within a situation, especially those who are expected to trust others with institutional power. That this trust must be earned is apparent, and is at least partially a matter of not violating the values and interests of those in subordinate positions. This does not imply that those in positions of power must be liked, however. On the contrary liking is an entirely independent issue - it is perfectly possible to like someone without trusting them, and to trust someone that is not liked. The important point is that trust is fragile, and, following the quotation from the head of the chapter, once lost is likely to be irretrievable.

Leadership can be defined as the construction, development and maintenance of frameworks for action, in particular collective or joint action. This raises issues of intersubjectivity. If people are to act together, they need to have consonant frames of reference, although these need not be identical. The process by which these frames of reference are established is what has been called leadership here.

In conclusion, it is clear that ‘followers’ can not, and should not, be dismissed merely as passive pawns in a game of leadership played only by those in positions of institutional power. On the contrary, it is ‘followers’ not leaders who set the most important parameters. Leaders are simply those to whom ‘followers’ concede leadership; those whom ‘followers’ choose to follow. ‘Followership’ far from being passively reactive, is an active role in leadership relations, perhaps, in the final analysis it is the active role. To discover the ‘rules’ of leadership, therefore, we need to study ‘followership’, and followers, not ‘leaders’.
References & bibliography

Hemphill, J. K. (1949) *Situational Factors in Leadership*. Columbus, Ohio: Ohio State University.


